However, classical nationalism is not only concerned with the creation of a state but also with its maintenance and strengthening. So, once the state is there, further options are opened for nationalists. They sometimes promote claims for its expansion even at the cost of wars and sometimes opt for isolationist policies.
The expansion is often justified by appeal to the unfinished business of bringing literally all members of the nation under one state, sometimes by the interest of the nation in gaining more territory and resources. As for maintenance of sovereignty by peaceful and merely ideological means, political nationalism is closely tied to nationalism in culture. The latter insists upon the preservation and transmission of a given culture, more accurately, of recognizably ethno-national traits of the culture in its pure form, dedicating artistic creation, education and research to this goal.
Of course, the ethno-national traits can be actual or invented, partly or fully so. Again, in the classical variant the relevant norm claims that one has both a right and an obligation "a sacred duty" to promote such a tradition.
Its force is that of a trump that wins over other interests and even over rights which is often needed in order to carry on national independence struggle. In consequence, classical nationalism has something to say about the level of attitudes as well: as for 1e it sees caring for one's nation a fundamental duty of each of its members and is prone to give to it, in its answer to 1f , an unlimited scope.
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Let me list its most important features for future reference: Classical nationalism is the political program that sees creation and maintenance of a fully sovereign state owned by a given ethno-national group "people" or "nation" as a primary duty of each member of the group. Starting from the assumption that the appropriate or "natural" unit of culture is the ethno-nation, it claims that a primary duty of each member is to abide in cultural matters by one's recognizably ethno-national culture. Classical nationalists are usually vigilant about the kind of culture they protect and promote and about the kind of attitude people have to their nation-state.
This watchful attitude carries some potential dangers: many elements of a given culture that are universalist or simply not recognizably national might, and will sometimes, fall prey to such nationalist enthusiasms. Classical nationalism in everyday life puts various additional demands on individuals, from buying more expensive domestically produced goods in preference to the cheaper imported ones, to procreating as many future members of the nation as one can manage.
See Yuval-Davies Besides classical nationalism and its more radical extremist cousins , various moderate views are also nowadays classified as nationalist. Indeed, the philosophical discussion has shifted to these moderate or even ultra-moderate forms, and most philosophers who describe themselves as nationalists propose very moderate nationalist programs.
Let me characterize these briefly: Nationalism in a wider sense is any complex of attitudes, claims and directives for action ascribing a fundamental political, moral and cultural value to nation and nationality and deriving special obligations and permissions for individual members of the nation and for any involved third parties, individual or collective from this ascribed value. Nationalisms, in this larger sense, can vary somewhat in their conceptions of nation which are often left implicit in their discourse , with respect to the ground and degree of its value and in the scope of claims and of prescribed obligations.
The term can also be applied to other cases not covered by classical nationalism, for instance, the hypothetical pre-state political forms that an ethnic identity might take. Moderate nationalism is a universalizing nationalism in the wider sense which is less demanding than classical nationalism.
It sometimes goes under the name of "patriotism. The variations of nationalism most relevant for philosophy are those that influence the moral standing of claims and of recommended nationalist practices. The elaborate philosophical views put forward in favor of nationalism will be referred to here to as "theoretical nationalist," the adjective serving to distinguish such views from the less sophisticated and more practical nationalist discourse. The central theoretical nationalist evaluative claims can usefully be put on the map of possible positions within political theory in the following somewhat simplified and schematic way.
Nationalist claims featuring the centrality of nation for political action provide an answer to two crucial general questions. First, is there one kind of large social group smaller than the whole of mankind that is morally of central importance or not? The nationalist answer is that there is just one, namely, the nation. When an ultimate choice is to be made, nation has priority.
Cookbooks, nationalism and gastronationalism
This answer is implied by rather standard definitions of nationalism offered by Berlin, discussed in Section 1, and Smith Second, what is the ground of obligation that the individual has to the morally central group? Is it voluntary or involuntary membership in the group? The typical contemporary nationalist thinker opts for the latter, while admitting that voluntary endorsement of one's national identity is a morally important achievement. On the philosophical map, the pro-nationalist normative tastes fit nicely with the communitarian stance in general: most pro-nationalist philosophers are communitarians who choose nation as the preferred community in contrast to those of their fellow-communitarians who prefer more far-ranging communities, such as those defined by global religious traditions.
However, some recent writers, e. We shall first describe the very heart of the nationalist program, i. These claims can be seen as answers to the normative subset of our initial questions about 1 pro-national attitudes and 2 actions. The claims thus recommend various courses of action, centrally those meant to secure and sustain the political organization - preferably a state - for the given ethno-cultural national community thereby making more specific the answers to our normative questions 1e, 1f, 2b, 2c.
Further, they enjoin the members of the community to promulgate recognizably ethno-cultural contents as central features of the cultural life within such a state. Finally, we shall discuss various lines of pro-nationalist thought that have been put forward in defense of these claims. For starters, let us return to the claims concerning the furthering of the national state and culture. These are proposed by the nationalist as a guide and a norm of conduct. Philosophically the most important variations concern three aspects of such normative claims: i.
The normative nature and strength of the claim: does it promote merely a right say, to have and maintain a form of political self-government, preferably and typically a state, or having cultural life centered upon a recognizably ethno-national culture , or a moral obligation to get and maintain one , or a moral, legal and political obligation?
The strongest claim is typical of classical nationalism: its typical norms are both moral and, once the nation-state is in place, legally enforceable obligations in regard to all parties concerned, including the individual members of the ethno-nation. A weaker, but still quite demanding version speaks only of moral obligation "sacred duty". A more liberal version is satisfied with a claim-right to having a state that would be "rightfully owned" by the ethno-nation.
The strength of the nationalist claim in relation to various external interests and rights: to give a real example, is the use of the domestic language so important that even international conferences should be held in it, at the cost of losing the most interesting participants from abroad?
The force of the nationalist claim is here being weighed against the force of other claims, those of individual or group interests, or rights. Variations in comparative strength of the claims take place on a continuum between two extremes.
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At one rather unpalatable extreme the nation-focused claims are seen as trumps that take precedence over any other claims, even over human rights. Further towards the center is the classical nationalism that gives nation-centered claims precedence over individual interest and many needs including pragmatic collective utility , but not necessarily over general human rights. See, for example, MacIntyre and Oldenquist On the opposite end, which is mild, humane and liberal, the central nationalist claims are accorded prima facie status only see Tamir and Gans For which groups are the nationalist claims meant to be valid?
What is their scope? First, they can be valid for every ethno-nation and thereby universal. An example would be the claim "every ethno-nation should have its own state.
Alternatively, a claim may be particularistic, such as the claim "Group X ought to have a state," where this implies nothing about any other group: Particularistic nationalism is the political program claiming that some ethno-nation should have its state, without extending the claim to all ethno-nations. It does it either A. I have dubbed the most difficult and indeed chauvinistic sub-case of particularism, i.
B , "invidious" since it explicitly denies the privilege of having a state to some peoples. Thomas Pogge proposes a further division of B into the "high" stance, which denies it to some types of groups, and the "low" one, which denies it to some particular groups. Serious theoretical nationalists usually defend only the universalist variety, whereas the nationalist-in-the-street most often the egoistic indeterminate one "Some nations should have a state, above all mine!
Classical nationalism comes both in particularistic and universalistic varieties.
Although the three dimensions of variation - internal strength, comparative strength and scope - are logically independent, they are psychologically and politically intertwined. People who are radical in one respect on the nationality issue tend also to be radical in other respects. In other words, attitudes tend to cluster together in stable clusters, so that extreme or moderate attitudes on one dimension psychologically and politically belong with extreme or moderate ones on others. The hybrids of extreme attitude on one dimension with moderate on the others are psychologically and socially unstable.
The nationalist picture of morality has been traditionally quite close to the dominant view in theory of international relations, called "realism. The view is explicit in Friederich Meinecke Introduction and Raymond Aron , and it is very close to the surface in Hans Morgenthau It nicely complements the main classical nationalist claim that each ethno-nation or people should have a state of its own and suggests what happens next: nation-states enter into competition in the name of their constitutive peoples.
The Moral Debate 3. Is national partiality justified and to what extent? What actions are appropriate for bringing sovereignty about? In particular, are ethno-national states and institutionally protected ethno- national cultures goods independent from the individual will of the members, and how far may one go in protecting them?
https://pracarunenri.ga The philosophical debate for and against nationalism is a debate about the moral validity of its central claims. In particular, the ultimate moral issue is the following: is any form of nationalism morally permissible or justified and, if not, how bad are particular forms of it? For a recent debate on partiality in general, see Chatterjee and Smith Why do nationalist claims require a defense? In some situations they seem plausible: for instance the plight of some stateless national groups - the history of Jews and Armenians, the misfortunes of Kurds - makes one spontaneously endorse the idea that having their own state would have solved the worst problems.
Still, there are good reasons to examine the nationalist claims more carefully. The most general reason is that it should first be shown that the political form of a nation state has some value as such, that a national community has a particular, or even preeminent moral and political value and that claims in its favor have normative validity.
Once this is established, a further defense is needed. Some classical nationalist claims appear to clash - at least under normal circumstances of contemporary life - with various values that people tend to accept. Some of these values are considered essential to liberal-democratic societies, while others are important specifically for the flourishing of culture and creativity.
The main values in the first set are individual autonomy and benevolent impartiality most prominently towards members of groups culturally different from one's own. The alleged special duties towards one's ethno-national culture can interfere, and often do interfere, with individuals' right to autonomy. Also, if these duties are construed very strictly they can interfere with other individual rights, e. Many feminist authors have noted that a suggestion typically offered by the nationalist, namely that women have a moral obligation to give birth to new members of the nation and to nurture them for the sake of the nation, clashes with both the autonomy and the privacy of these women Yuval-Davis and Okin , and Another endangered value is diversity within the ethno-national community, which can also be thwarted by the homogeneity of a central national culture.
Nation-oriented duties also interfere with the value of unconstrained creativity, e.